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1.  Introduction1 
 
 
The pace of changes in world politics seems to be enormous, and it is. This impression may 
be stronger among people still remembering the seemingly cozy times of the Cold War than 
by those who were born and grew up more recently . There is hardly any doubt that most 
people on this planet, no matter where and how they live, and how well-trained they are in 
analyzing political processes -, find it difficult to understand the character of the processes 
going on around them. If we do not comprehend the context and texture of our present, how-
ever, it is risky to think about our future, or to make predictions.  
Thus I start with the factors that I think are a given now, and will be for the foreseeable fu-
ture. This includes the question of what is new and what is not so new after 1989/91 and 
after September 2001. 
Then I proceed by defining the variables which will over the next ten years determine the two 
most relevant global political outcomes: the prospects for stability and cooperation. 
And finally I draw up three scenarios for how we might get from now to then. These are: the 
Coming Anarchy; Gated Communities; and Global Learning. These three scenarios will be 
developed for nine cases: Capital, energy, and content flows; the roles of the United States, 
the Russian Federation, the European Union, and China, respectively; regional conflicts; and 
structural problems.  
While the views outlined in this article are German and European positions, they are certainly 
not the German or, even less so, the European way of reasoning. 
 
                                                 
1  I would like to thank Gwendolyn Sasse and Björn Warkalla for their helpful comments on the draft version of 
this paper.  
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2.  Making sense of changes in World Politics 
 
 
The Traditional Context 
 
Many analytical and political problems result from concepts which are deeply embedded in 
Cold War thinking and, more general, in the logic of the Westphalian state system. Text-
books, the media, families, political decision makers and, to some extent, researchers still 
use terms and concepts for making sense of world politics that were, and are, a result of a 
bygone era. These ‘old’ concepts are not - or only partly - able to cover the reality of global 
politics in the early 21st century. 
After the Thirty Years’ War, a new concert of powers and new rules for the international 
game were established. Concepts like sovereignty and territoriality became the international 
norm. The notion of the modern nation state as the main agent for developing national 
economies and for protecting oneself against competitors and intruders, for providing public 
goods and creating homogeneous cultural spaces came to the fore. It was rather effective, 
and has been close to being worshipped ever since. Collecting taxes, organizing armed 
forces and educational systems became the main internal functions of governments. Estab-
lishing, defending and sometimes moving borders were the decisive external tasks. Going to 
war was not the first option but quite a legitimate one, once no other options for protecting 
the state’s interests were available.  
The macrostructure of politics changed twice in the 20th century: The first World War signified 
and brought about the decline of at least three empires: the Ottoman, the Russian, and the 
British empire. Post-revolutionary Russia was on her way toward a mobilizational as well as 
an etatistic “socialism in one country”; post-revolutionary Germany on her way toward a be-
lated and derailed modernization, finally executed in the form of national socialism; and Ja-
pan had to cope with a difficult adaptation to the modernization process that started after the 
Meiji revolution and was always held back by traditional patterns. These three countries, their 
domestic instability and the resulting international disequilibria produced upheaval and de-
struction. 
The global economy experienced a shift from the first generation motors of industrialization, 
the steam engine, iron, textiles and steel, to motor vehicles (auto manufacturing), electricity 
and the chemical industry. The great depression in the late 1920s was a reminder that this 
development did not proceed smoothly. The interwar-period was culturally stimulating, but 
politically and economically inherently unstable.  
The Second World War, resulting from these destabilizing factors, ended with the establish-
ment of a new macrostructure. From now on, symbolized by the Yalta Conference, there 
were two powers, defending their respective blocs centered around two poles: The US-led 
part of the world, driven by largely market-regulated mechanisms, organized in formal de-
mocracies and generating increasing wealth for the “developed” parts of the world; and the 
USSR-led group of states, driven by an extensive growth model, organized in formal one-
party systems and reproducing itself by administrative markets and all-encompassing bar-
gaining mechanisms, providing basic social services on a rather low level. 
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Most of the other states had to opt for one of the two sides. Shifting between them was pos-
sible – sometimes. Keeping out of the conflict between the two sides during the Cold War 
was difficult, and China was the only – and growing – player who managed to do so. In those 
four decades automatization and electronics, computers and biotechnology engulfed all the 
most developed sectors of the world economy. In contrast to its predecessor, this period was 
intrinsically stable – contrary to widespread assumptions at the time. While there were seri-
ous international crises and even regional wars (1950/51 in Korea, 1967 in the Middle East, 
and in the 1960s and early 1970s Vietnam), a direct military confrontation between the two 
powers was never likely. 
This period was characterized by a binary code, notwithstanding attempts to defect from this 
logic by some liberalizing elites and countries in the “Third World” and by political movements 
even at the core of the two blocs (Budapest 1956, Paris and Berlin in 1967, Prague and 
Berkeley 1968, Italy and France in the 1970s). Basically, it was “them versus us”, between 
two world blocs, and this gruesome logic was forced upon all movements and persons who 
carefully or desperately tried to “break out”, as dissenters in the Eastern bloc experienced 
with more force and brutality but no less dichotomic intensity than the new political and social 
movements in the West.  
This was the period of the Cold War, while apparently fought over values and ideologies, in 
which on closer inspection economic interests, aspects of (in)security and raw power mat-
tered more. Strategic interaction between the two blocs and their lead actors was embedded 
in a web of institutions and bargaining mechanisms, offering guaranteed spaces for domina-
tion patterns, economic and otherwise, inside those blocs. What is important here for our 
argument and what should not be forgotten is that beyond all details and differences this bi-
polar macro system was stable, and it provided at least a basic feeling of security and be-
longing to something steady for most of the societies and elites. 
The basic stability of the international macro structure was also related to the increasing role 
of international institutions – the Bretton Woods system, the United Nations and its Security 
Council, the CSCE and OSCE mechanisms, arms control and trade regimes and, more re-
cently, norms for preserving the environment and for supporting human rights. The most 
relevant actors – the USSR and the US – never really rocked the boat, at least not beyond a 
certain extent. At the end of the day, there were two players who had to sort things out – 
which is what they did. 
 
The New Context of World Politics 
 
Westphalian and Cold War language still dominates most private and public discourses on 
global and world politics. But it is no longer linked to a context that can sufficiently be de-
scribed in these terms - because the macro structure has undergone significant changes. 
The Westphalian system is no longer in place, even when its formal relics are still around. 
The binary Cold War system has crumbled – or has been overcome.  
States and governments do not control most processes of global politics any more. The basic 
activities are represented and may be described as flows (of capital, communication, enter-
tainment, goods and services, people) rather than as organized exchanges. The container 
state is still around, but the containers have lost many or most of their black box attributes. 
National governments can hardly control these flows, at least not on their own.  
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Moreover, the currency of politics has changed. Military power still matters – sometimes - as 
has been demonstrated most recently by the US-led campaign against Iraq in 2003 and by 
the Western-imposed measures against Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Nevertheless, this is hardly 
the appropriate tool to achieve the main players’ goals in global times. The armed forces of 
the only remaining classical world power, the US, still can – alone or with allies - inflict con-
siderable harm on one or two state adversaries and thereby deny them certain options: Sad-
dam Hussein was forced out of Kuwait and in a second round out of power, similar to Mil-
osevic who was forced out of Kosovo and subsequently out of power. But this is no guaran-
tee for positive solutions, as both cases aptly demonstrate. In the Middle East the U.S. have 
not been and are not able to dictate anything approaching an acceptable, or imposable, solu-
tion. The currency of military power, when applied in a very complex world, cannot produce 
adequate outcomes. 
In this new context, transnational capital flows are more relevant than national budgets, 
transnational cultural images and discourses are challenging national cultures, strategies of 
access and denial, of in- and exclusion are more decisive than guarding national borders. In 
such a new environment, a new cartography of power and access is urgently required in or-
der to overcome the old standards of mapping. New tools for spreading influence and for 
dominating the nodes of webs and networks are emerging. The nodes and hubs of flows, 
cascades of power tools, new centralities of patchworks are at least as important as conquer-
ing the capitals of states. The old question of Stalin regarding the number of the pope’s divi-
sions looks outdated. What matters today is the influence in and over rating agencies, con-
tent producers and images. 
We can compose a list of six attributes of global politics which are characteristic of the new 
inter- and transnational context after the Westphalian and the Cold War systems: 
 
The game of global politics is a multilevel game. Relevant actions, interactions, and 
flows take place and have effects on different levels at the same time: the global, the 
international, the transnational, the national, the regional, the societal and the individ-
ual. This complicates the problem of intentionality. The likelihood of unintended con-
sequences of an action happening on one level is multiplied by the linkages between 
many levels. Also, the levels can hardly be isolated from one another. 
Many more relevant actors are involved in global politics than in international politics 
at any time before in the last 100, 50 or even 15 years. These actors are related to 
the spheres of the state; the market; and the social and societal context. Important 
cleavages are public vs. private, and state vs. non-state. Who are the relevant ac-
tors? States still play an important role as regulators, and especially as the target for 
public expectations. But this role is diminishing and changing. State actors have to lo-
cate themselves in a colorful picture containing many other actors. Additionally, there 
are IOs, international regimes, TNCs, NGOs, regional players (supra- and sub-state), 
the media, domestic structures and interests, and individuals – from Mr. Bush and Mr. 
Gates to Mr. Haider and Mr. Atta. Or Mother Theresa.  
The relative strength of different groups of players is shifting – depending on the 
game and on the available hard and soft resources. The decisive power currencies 
of all kinds of actors are much more diverse than the military as the core element of 
hard power. Asymmetries between the diverse actors can be extreme – the relations 
between Al Qaeda und the U.S. or between Falun Gong and the Chinese authorities 
are just two examples. 
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There are no clearly delineated boundaries between the domestic and the external 
spheres of politics anymore. The global environment can have a decisive impact on 
domestic constellations. Domestic structures and coalitions produce significant 
changes in the transnational landscape. Even rather sophisticated concepts like sec-
ond image reversed, two-level games and the internationalization of domestic politics 
look a bit outdated today. To put it bluntly: The problem is not so much one of link-
ages between the domestic and the international spheres, but rather the vanishing of 
the markers between those realms. 
The nature of interactions is increasingly difficult to monitor, to control and to govern. 
Diplomats may talk about many things, but their impact on capital markets is limited – 
to say the least. The impact of satellites transmitting content into different cultural set-
tings can hardly be predicted and is difficult to regulate. Many capital and content 
flows are difficult to organize and cannot be regulated effectively – at least not by the 
traditional instruments and strategies inherited from the Westphalian and Cold War 
settings. 
The very concept of regulating and controlling processes and developments is in cri-
sis. Regulation requires a clear conception of the relevant players’ interests and re-
sources, viable mechanisms for monitoring, sufficient funding, tools for impacting on 
the actors involved, providing incentives for relevant actors to accept governance 
mechanisms, and, first and foremost, it requires concepts as to what should be regu-
lated and in what way. There is much talk about global governance but very limited 
clarity about how this should be done. 
 
In reality, we have a patchwork of parallel, co-existing and competing norms, tools and sys-
tems of governance. The very term “governance” is in crisis. What is needed is fresh thinking 
about new concepts which are more appropriate for the early 21st century – concepts of 
moderating and of navigating. To moderate processes does not mean to change their direc-
tion but to influence the intensity and the pace of their development. To navigate trends and 
currents is even less of an ‘engineering’ concept: here one just tries to move in and between 
the currents of processes the sources and driving forces of which are beyond anyone’s con-
trol. 
This list gives a brief impression of what is new in global politics, compared to both the 
Westphalian and the Cold War systems. The new qualities of these attributes have not been 
designed and did not come to bear in 1989 or 1991, or in 2001. But those years and the 
events related to them symbolize the changing currents at a deeper level.  
My basic prediction is that these new attributes will be present for quite some time - definitely 
beyond 2010. We should not expect any actor or institution to restore some sort of higher 
order in the game of global politics. The world is not unilateral or neo-imperial – whatever 
degree of military power the US may reach. It is, obviously, not a UN-regulated world either. 
We have to live in, and cope with, this kind of an insecure environment, at least for the com-
ing decades. 
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The world in the first decade of this century 
 
One cannot address, explain or forecast everything in global politics. Some selection for the 
readers’ and the author’s purposes have to be made. In this context, two qualities will be 
defined as outcomes (dependent variables) which will be explained or predicted. These vari-
ables will serve as our main criteria for different scenarios. For the sake of our experiment, 
we will keep the number of dependent variables small and limit them to just two: in-/stability 
of rule acceptance, and non-/cooperation between actors. 
This selection may seem traditional and outdated to some readers. I don’t think it is: Most 
people are interested in environments providing exactly these qualities. Without stability, in-
stitutions will not work adequately. Without a visible shadow of the future, stability and work-
ing institutions cannot be guaranteed. Stability is a requirement for predictability. Those con-
cepts – stability and cooperation - are also well taken as benchmarks for defining relevant 
outcomes in global politics. 
Stability (or the absence of it) is defined as a decisive quality of the global and European 
landscapes. Stability does not require romantic visions of conflict free zones. It implies the 
existence of stable and workable institutions (rules) that may be changed in organized ways, 
at least in core regions. 
This presupposes shared basic interests, a strong shadow of the future and relatively long 
time horizons, the experience and expectation of repeated games, producing effective institu-
tions for sustainable development, effective mechanisms for conflict regulation or resolution, 
incentives and tools for exchanging goods, services and images, conditions for access to 
relevant flows and for not too diverse images and identities. 
Cooperation (or the absence of it) is the other decisive quality of global and European land-
scapes. It does not imply complete consent of interests, same-class players or the absence 
of conflicts. Rather, similar interest patterns are required for rules, time horizons and, conse-
quently, for stability. Additionally, conducive to cooperation are the capacity to address dif-
ferent, and different classes of, actors; linkages between different levels of action (and of 
analysis); and an interest in the predominance of absolute, not relative gains. 
Now we turn to our independent variables (IV) causing variation in the outcomes: structural 
changes and modifications of the macro configuration characterized by these six new attrib-
utes of world politics. They should not be expected to change greatly over the next ten years. 
The global, then, is conditioned and characterized by these six factors: multilevel games; 
multitude of actors; shifting strength of actors and type of resources; no markers between the 
domestic and the global; new quality of interaction – flows; crisis of control concepts. 
These factors can be defined as independent variables for determining the future course of 
world politics. With these factors, we can define a maximum of six independent variables 
possibly causing variation of our two dependent variables, and thereby constituting different 
scenarios. These scenarios will be defined in the next part of this article. For systematic and 
for practical reasons, we limit the number of operating IVs to three. 
 
12  OEI-Arbeitspapiere 47/2003 
IV 1: Number of relevant levels of political games. 
Hypothesis 1: Fewer significant levels generate more stability and more cooperation. It 
seems difficult to extend institutions effective on one level to other levels. 
Theoretical basis: Neoinstitutionalism.  
 
IV 2: Number of relevant actors involved. 
Hypothesis 2: Fewer relevant actors produce more stability and cooperation. The greater 
the number of relevant players, the more difficult to impose authority and to avoid moral haz-
ard and defection problems. 
Theoretical basis: Collective action. 
 
IV 3: Relative strength of actors and type of resources. 
Hypothesis 3: Combinations of hard and soft resources are conducive to furthering stability 
and cooperation. Separation of hard and soft resources between different types of actors 
adversely affect stability and cooperation. Clear signals and credible announcements are 
important. 
Theoretical basis: Rational choice and system theory.  
 
IV 4: Relationship between domestic and global factors. 
No hypothesis formulated. The boundaries between domestic and international matters are 
blurred. No significant variance can be expected. 
 
IV 5: Type of interaction – controlled exchange or flows. 
No hypothesis formulated. The number and intensity of flows is likely to be neutral regard-
ing stability and cooperation, or the concept of flows is not compatible with these concepts.  
 
IV 6: Control concepts. 
No hypothesis suggested. The concepts of regulation and control are hardly compatible with 
the other features. Required are ideas of navigating in world politics. 
 
We thus avoid an overly complex setting and produce three independent variables and 
three hypotheses for two varying outcomes to be explained.2 Each of these scenarios will 
                                                 
2  For theoreticians: Obviously, there is not one image for events and processes preferred on the dependent side, 
and also not one preferred image on the explaining, independent side. All pure, traditional and current models 
are left aside (realism, world system) or modified (institutionalism, liberalism/ domestic structures, constructiv-
ism). We assume that all actors in all contexts and on every level act first of all to guarantee their survival. Addi-
tionally, they try to maximize all other utilities and behave, in this sense, rational (goal oriented). Basic prefer-
ences are exogenous, knowledge may be bounded, communication is accepted, learning may take place. 
These operational principles are assumed to be true for every actor on every level – not just for states.  
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be developed for nine cases. Those cases are both related to flows and to places and 
spaces.  
Three cases are related to flows, i.e. to rather new, late 20th century forms of interaction.  
Capital flows may be found at different levels: regional, national, inter- and transnational, 
and global. They are formalized or informal. Mostly, they are channeled via commercial and 
state banks. Yet there are informal mechanisms of transactions of capital as well. The latter 
seem to gain in importance. Capital flows are the blood circulation of global capitalism. 
Content flows are another example of a rather new global phenomenon. Content flows con-
sist of mainly three components: information, communication, and entertainment. Information 
in digital form is accessible through the world wide web. It has, by now, become the most 
important source for storing, processing and retrieving knowledge. Almost everything can be 
found on the internet. Moreover, communication in the form of electronic mail has become 
the primary form of exchange in the global world. Cell phones are widespread, not only in 
capitals and cities. Content flows are the brain circuits of post-modernism;  
Energy is, besides knowledge, the most important resource of the 21st century. Dependency 
on energy imports or, conversely, the availability of resources for self-demand or export are 
decisive factors in Europe’s development. Indeed, energy is the fuel of industrial and post-
industrial economies. 
Four cases represent countries or regional blocs: 
The United States (US) is sometimes called the only remaining superpower after the end of 
the Cold War. Others speak of a unilateral world order with one pole – the US These views 
are not adequate, at least not sufficient. They are caught up in Westphalian state-level and 
great power thinking. They overlook how many important debates are taking place in the US, 
how diverse and heterogeneous this country is, and how limited even US power is when it 
comes to enforcing political outcomes and implementing political solutions.  
The Russian Federation (RF) is important, at least for Europe. This is a difficult region, 
slowly moving toward more internal stability and cooperation. The future development of the 
RF is of great importance to the prospects of the rest of Europe. 
The European Union (EU) is the framework for most of Europe located West of the RF. 
These European countries are either member states, or candidates for this status – including 
Turkey.  
China is the emerging dominant actor in Asia. The importance of China is related to both the 
number of its inhabitants and, increasingly, its economic dynamism.  
Additionally, two non-regional cases will be included. 
Regional conflicts have been the single most important source of violent unrest for many 
decades. They can be framed in ethnic, religious, cultural or other terms. 
Structural problems, especially that of widening legitimacy gaps (differentials between rep-
resentation and effectiveness) in national and global politics. The agencies entitled to do poli-
tics are not able to deliver, while those who effectively shape politics are not always democ-
ratically legitimized to do so. 
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3.  Scenarios and Cases 
 
 
I offer three basic scenarios for the European and Eurasian political development up to 2010. 
This is not the place and the framework for testing all the proposed hypotheses in detail, but I 
will examine the nine cases in three scenarios regarding two possible outcomes. The differ-
ing outcomes are influenced by three independent variables – levels of activity, the number 
of actors and the type of resources.  
 
Scenario 1: The Coming Anarchy3 
 
 Independent Variables  
 Many or more levels of political action, weakly interconnected. 
 Many players of different origin and potentials. 
 Huge variety in terms of resource potentials 
Values of Outcomes  
 Low stability 
 Low cooperation 
 
Capital flows 
At this point in time - in 2003 - it does not seem likely that effective formal or informal mecha-
nisms for regulating capital flows – from the local to the global level – will be introduced. 
There are too many actors, levels, forms and statuses involved.  
Thus, capital flows, which fuel regional, national and global economies, will continue to be 
underregulated. Recent cases like the national defaults in Southeast Asia and Russia (1998), 
Mexico (….) and Argentine (2002) as well as the downturn of the dotcom-related sectors of 
the world economy with all its consequences in 2001 and thereafter, show that capital flows 
will enhance the risks for stability and cooperation. Although there are positive examples for 
regulation in certain regions and areas, for example the introduction of the Euro in Western 
Europe and possibly though not likely, the introduction of a tax for short-term capital transac-
tions, these mechanisms will hardly be extended or implemented effectively. Regulatory 
mechanisms that do not preclude defection and bypassing are probably more risky in terms 
of stability and predictability than not having mechanisms in place at all. Accordingly, the 
partial introduction of some rules in some regions may lead to more instability because the 
actors in capital markets are uncertain as to which rules are valid or enforceable in what re-
                                                 
3  This metaphor is borrowed from Robert Kaplan (Kaplan, Robert D. (1994), The Coming Anarchy. How Scarcity, 
Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet, in: At-
lantic Monthly, Feb. 1994, 44-76). 
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gions. Actors, then, have strong incentives to defect to less regulated markets and regions, in 
particular offshore regions, or to swerve into informal channels. 
Apart from the money transfers through state and commercial banks, there are also informal 
money flows, like the Hawala, based on informal networks. Hawala-type capital transactions 
are especially difficult to monitor and regulate and can be expected to increase. Capital flows 
come in legal as well as in illegal forms. The aggregate amount of money moved across and 
around the globe is enormous. In sum, increasing capital flows and a less than modest regu-
lation will contribute significantly to economic and political instability.  
Energy 
High dependency of the European economies on energy imports makes Europe highly con-
tingent on the internal developments in regions which seem increasingly volatile. This is es-
pecially true for the Middle East. If the either unstable or authoritarian regimes in countries 
like Libya, Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain fall prey to unorganized regime changes and/ or Islamic 
populist movements and/or to foreign intervention (in the case of Iraq) energy prices will (at 
least temporarily) skyrocket and put the European economies on a downward slope – at 
least in the short term. Russian and Norwegian resources would only partly compensate for 
that. Energy-saving counter- strategies would be encouraged and developed too late – as 
usual. 
The resulting economic downturn would increase domestic populist sentiments in some 
European countries. Individual European governments would be tempted to conclude special 
deals with rogue regimes in energy-rich countries. This may endanger the coherence of the 
EU. In sum, continued high dependency on energy imports from potentially unstable regions 
will produce turmoil in Europe once those export regions emerge as conflict areas.  
Content flows 
Entertainment products like news, movies on video or DVD, TV serials, digitally stored music, 
and games are being produced worldwide, in Hollywood as well as in India, in Hong Kong 
and in Russia. They are distributed around the globe via the Internet, on videos, DVDs, CD 
ROMs, TV sets and via other channels. Contrary to some assumptions, the effect is not ho-
mogenization but rather indigenization, leading to mergers of local cultural images with the 
globally transmitted digital content. This tends to accentuate local and regional diversities. 
Elite groups will try – and are already doing so - to exploit popular sentiments and exacer-
bate cultural differences. 
Content flows are by nature local, national, regional and global: They are genuinely multilevel 
phenomena. Actors are manifold. The producers and distributors involved exceed hundreds 
of thousands, from BBC journalists over film studios to child pornography producers. Their 
resources are diverse in terms of capital intensity as well as their ability to organize hege-
monic images and counter-images. There are hundreds of millions of consumers.  
 Like capital flows content flows are not effectively regulated. Property rights regimes for con-
tent are as underregulated as the transmission of images of sex and violence. Most attempts 
by national governments to introduce protectionist mechanisms against content flows have 
failed. In Europe, it is particularly unlikely that regulation, if imposed, could be effective. The 
role of the Internet and of illegally produced and distributed carriers of digital content is in-
creasing to an extent that the effective regulation of content flows becomes unlikely.  
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In sum, in Europe and most of Eurasia detrimental effects of content flows may be limited. 
The cultural background in most European societies is not – at least not yet - heterogeneous 
enough to serve as a background for manipulating and instigating conflicts, and for social 
unrest. Nevertheless, there are enough hot spots (Northern Caucasus, the Balkans, Corsica, 
Northern Ireland, the Basque country, to name just a few) where images generated, rein-
forced or changed by content flows could produce more instability.  
The Role of the US 
Evidently, the Bush jr. administration has an increasingly strong antipathy toward building 
and maintaining international institutions: the ABM treaty, the Kyoto protocol, the steel quotas 
debate, the International Criminal Court and the Iraq campaign without UN-legitimization are 
but a few examples. 
The US is the most powerful individual actor worldwide. Still, it can neither unilaterally inte-
grate different levels of activity, nor focus successfully on one and ignore the others. It also 
cannot subordinate all other relevant state, and especially non-state, actors. The US can 
build and buy coalitions but this is different from cooperation patterns and mechanisms. For 
the foreseeable future, the willingness of the US to get engaged in European and Eurasian 
conflicts might be limited. Apparently, so-called terrorist threats are more relevant for the US 
population, media and decision-makers. Thus, the single most important factor of stability in 
Europe after 1945 may not be working anymore – at least not automatically.  
Consequently, the Europeans have to take care of themselves, also in the realm of (hard) 
security. A division of labor between a “Hobbesian” US and “an “institutionalized” postmodern 
Europe is difficult to imagine. So the partial withdrawal (or relocation) of US troops from 
Europe can contribute to increasing instability and even decreasing cooperation. 
The Role of the Russian Federation  
Russia is huge and rich in resources. It has nukes and a relatively well educated population. 
Yet, while the USSR already was an incomplete superpower in the sense that it was similarly 
(not equally) powerful as the US in terms of military projection capacities although it could 
never match US economic capabilities and cultural attractiveness, Russia is definitely far 
away from playing in the same league of state actors as the US. It is still coping with the diffi-
cult double challenge of transforming Soviet-style institutions and adapting to globalization.  
In terms of resources, there are not too many “hard” assets. Available resources are mainly 
energy, gold and some arms exports that generate cash income. The brain factor is positive 
– the educational system is comparatively good. Yet the military sector is not well organized, 
the armed forces cannot cope with the partly criminal, partly separatist groups in Chechnya 
and in other places. Parts of the North Caucasus are not effectively organized and controlled 
by anyone.  
Russia is a fine example of a patchwork situation. This means that depending on where we 
look – at Russia in general, at individual regions or cities, at certain age groups or genera-
tional cohorts, at functional elites and ethnic minorities, the impressions are very different. 
General statements about “Russia” are mostly misleading. In the 1990s, public goods, not 
provided by the central state any more, were more often than not offered in regional, informal 
or privatized forms. The enormous multiplicity of actors was – and is - an impediment to any 
coherent action. There are no identifiable aggregated national interests. 
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While Russia is internally definitely more consistent now than in the 1990s, it is an open 
question if, how fast and with what success it will integrate into global mechanisms. Possibly, 
parts of Russia will or cannot be associated with international regimes or institutions. This 
would make political perspectives for the rest of Europe appear more cloudy. A stable Russia 
was and is one of the few classic features of European politics – for good reasons. If the re-
gional and functional contexts of Russia disintegrate, however, Russia will follow suit. 
The Role of the European Union 
In terms of the consistency of actors, the weakness of the European model (or rather its self-
imposed caricature) is apparent. Not only the multitude of national actors (represented in the 
Councils of Ministers), often taking contradictory positions, but also the diversity of regional 
actors (organized weakly in the Committee of the Regions) and of the central EU organiza-
tions makes it awkward, in many instances, to talk about “Europe”.  
The EU’s weakness is even more visible when it comes to its role in global politics. With the 
possible exception of the 2001 EU regulation in Macedonia and the selective retaliation 
against US import quotas for steel imports in 2002, there is not much that could be presented 
as a success story for a united Europe shaping global politics – or even European security 
politics. The flip side of European criticism of US unilateralism is the inability of the Europe-
ans to formulate common positions. This makes Europe vulnerable and ineffective. Depend-
ency on energy imports, migration pressures and other security issues could contribute to an 
overload of tasks to be addressed by EU agencies and national governments which might 
produce competition and fragmentation rather than cooperation. 
While it does not seem likely that the EU itself disintegrates, it is absolutely conceivable that 
the pending institutional reforms, the digestion of new members (at least ten) and possible 
crises in Europe or beyond, prove that the EU is not able to act coherently and as a global 
actor. The new political modus operandi, shaped by the mass media, permanent election 
campaigns and ad-hoc styles of political processes, may further weaken the EU’s decision-
making ability. 
The Role of China 
The prospects of China’s development are uncertain. Robust economic growth rates and 
WTO membership are among the positive developments. On the other side, however, there 
are increasing socio-economic differences between the provinces, visible unrest (labor pro-
tests and ethnic conflicts) and clearly deficient participation mechanisms. Also, there are at-
tempts to control citizens’ access to the WWW.  
If Taiwan proceeds with its course of independence, if the further path of the southern prov-
inces (Shanghai, the Pearl Delta including Hong Kong) leads away from the heartland, and if 
separatist moods take hold in the northern provinces, the coherence of China could be en-
dangered. While the immediate effect of such a development on Europe may be limited, 
there could be indirect detrimental effects on Europe and especially on Eurasia in the longer 
run. Separatist and fundamentalist movements in Central Asia and in the Caucasian region 
would then be almost unavoidable. 
Regional Conflicts 
Armed conflicts in the Middle East are negative for Europe – no matter what the immediate 
reasons for the conflict may be. The recent military campaign of a US-led “coalition of the 
willing” produced not only a Europe in diplomatic disarray. In future, energy prices would 
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probably be seriously affected, further regime changes could become more likely, and Is-
lamic populist moods among Muslims living in Europe could become activated.  
Almost all countries in Central Asia have to strike a difficult balance between modernization 
pressures and defensive, Islamist reactions and options. This is a delicate situation: while 
Europe must be ready to condemn authoritarian regimes in the region for principal reasons, 
there is a risk of fundamentalist regimes, no less authoritarian. destabilization. It is not clear 
whether the current regimes will be able to steer a course of effective modernization and 
integration without estranging huge parts of their predominantly young populations. 
The appearance of Al Qaida and related movements indicates a broad anti-Western, anti-
secular trend in huge parts of the southern world. Islam serves as a handy framework of ref-
erence rather than as an instigator among these groups. Unless the countries with significant 
Islamic populations manage to combine modernity and integration into global developments 
with at least minimal positive redistributional effects, with access to education and employ-
ment for the increasing young population, and with secular interpretations of the core values 
of the Koran, transnational social conflicts could inflame whole regions.  
Moreover, new conflicts in the Balkans would prove that Europe is definitely not able to keep 
its own house in order.  
Structural Problems 
It is not a constructive development that in addition to the above mentioned tendencies con-
ducive to a coming anarchy, the European democracies are in danger of an erosion of basic 
rules of liberal democracies. The most troubling tendency is the weakening of the legitimacy 
of representative organs. While national governments are legitimized, their range and poten-
tials of political governance are shrinking. At the same time, many actors who are involved in 
European and global politics are not, or not sufficiently, legitimized – especially the European 
Commission. But also TNCs and NGOs have limited democratic authority.  
In addition, the survival of Western-type societies is questionable. While in a certain sense 
the world at large has indeed reached the “end of history” insofar as there are no positive 
alternative visions and world views to global capitalism and formal democracy, there is an-
other potentially gruesome interpretation of this metaphor: fundamentalist opponents of secu-
lar, liberal societies are threatening Western-type societies. These prospects are for many 
still scifi-visions. Yet there are sober assessments and expectations indicating that the Euro-
pean-type civil mode of deliberation and operation is in danger. To go further along the path 
of de-territorialization and decreasing sovereignty – which seems likely, if not unavoidable - 
could produce an erosion of traditional European societies, a process which is hard to pre-
dict, and even harder to accept. 
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Scenario 2: A Gated Community 
 
Independent Variables  
 Some levels of political action, partly interconnected. 
 Many players of different origin and capabilities. 
 Certain variety in terms of resource potentials.  
Values of Outcomes  
 Selective In/stability 
 Selective Cooperation 
 
This scenario does not differ much from the scenario of a coming anarchy in its basic as-
sumptions regarding risks for stability and cooperation. The environment of European coun-
tries and societies is becoming much more complex and unpredictable. Yet the assumption 
here is that it is possible to organize a European core space which is able to more or less 
preserve basic values and habits of liberal and plural societies – as a gated community. 
Capital flows 
EU mechanisms may partly be effective in monitoring and regulating or, at least, navigating 
capital flows. The European Central Bank has earned a solid reputation, and the Euro is per-
forming well after initial problems with credibility. The Euro could continue to rival the USD as 
an effective world currency. The Euro zone can be strengthened even further by expanding 
into the Northern and East European regions not yet included. 
At the same time, there clearly are limits to enlargement; overstretching and extension must 
be avoided. The Atlantic ocean, the north of Scandinavia, and the Mediterranean are natural 
borders of Europe. Turkey may be fortified as an outpost, not a bridge toward Asia. To fulfill 
the same role would certainly be much more difficult for the Russian Federation. Still, the RF 
might serve as a buffer. All other problems – defaults by Latin American or South East Asian 
states, FDI hunger in Africa and other developing macro regions, Hawala – might and will be 
ignored.  
Energy 
Dependency on energy imports is a significant risk for Europe. Yet closer cooperation, and 
integration with Eastern Europe might reduce these risks considerably. Norwegian resources 
are relevant. Decisive moves toward energy-saving technologies can be negotiated and im-
plemented by a strong European Commission. Still, without imports from the Middle East 
region, a gated Europe seems hardly conceivable. Yet given the well-known problems of oil 
exporting countries with collective action, it can be expected that at least some governments 
defect from OPEC or Arab League decisions to diminish European fuel problems. 
Content flows 
For content flows, Europe is a primary target. There is too much purchasing power to be ig-
nored or circumvented. Europe also has gained rich experience in absorbing imported con-
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tent flows. It can be assumed and arranged that content flows – especially information and 
communication – will not be disruptive.  
The Role of the US 
Especially since 2001, the US are perceived in Europe as a state avoiding institutional con-
straints and trying to unilaterally seek solutions in line with their own interests. But the EU 
could become more important as an actor if it succeeded to act in a more united way. Per-
ceived common threats to Europe from abroad will help to finally bring about a more effective 
common or even united foreign and security policy.  
It should be realized that in many cases commercial and civil non-state actors do not act ac-
cording to US interests –not even in the US herself. Counterbalancing on the level of states 
and state organizations, supranational regimes and networks of non-state actors may effec-
tively neutralize the predominant influence of the United States on hard assets. A common 
European voice regarding important issues will neutralize U.S: ambitions and potentials. 
The Role of the RF  
The new Russian leadership (since 2000) is clearly aware of Russia’s precarious situation 
and the competitive context of the global economy. The orientation of Mr. Putin’s administra-
tion is unequivocal toward integration into global regimes, global markets and European con-
texts.  
The EU can – and should – accept this situation and enhance the Russian tendencies toward 
integration. A stable Russia east of the EU would greatly improve the stability of a gated 
Europe.  
The Role of the European Union 
Europe in the form of the EU is historically and culturally a world power. Economically, it 
more or less matches the US position.  
It has a huge advantage because the principle of subsidiarity, the different layers of policy 
making mechanisms and of financial budgets and redistribution provisions provide the basis 
for effectively integrating local, regional (sub state), state and regional (supra state) levels. 
Cultural diversity is persistent, attractive, and helps to further integration. 
The traditional ineptitude and impotence of the EU to act jointly, independently and decisively 
probably needs significant, even dramatic exogenous impacts. . 
When the Europeans finally strengthen EU mechanisms sufficiently to make a common 
European policy possible in the most important policy fields, Europe could play a much more 
important role on a global scale, and it could guarantee a prosperous Europe – even when 
the neighboring regions become more volatile. This requires an effective economic, financial 
and security policy.  
The Role of China 
The future role of China – be it a fragmented or a dynamic, integrationist China – would pro-
vide solid reasons for making Europe a strong actor on a global scale. This actor would 
demonstrate its strength by enforcing its borders and not by demonstrating decisiveness and 
projecting its force abroad. China may become a partner, but mutual dependency will be 
avoided. 
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Regional Conflicts 
Regional conflicts, permanently transmitted into European living rooms via TV and a long 
history of failed attempts to stabilize, rebuild and transform failing states finally led to a Euro-
pean consensus on not getting drawn into regional non-European conflicts. While the Bal-
kans have been stabilized by the permanent presence of military units and peace-keeping 
forces, conflicts in Central Asia, the Trans-Caucasus, the Middle East, South East Asia and 
Latin America are not a European priority. Some of these conflicts are addressed by the 
United States, others are glimmering – sometimes intensifying, sometimes receding. Europe 
is not engaged actively. Russia has problems to insulate herself against notorious instabili-
ties in the northern and Trans-Caucasian regions. The effect is unclear.  
The events in Afghanistan and Pakistan after 9/11 and Western involvement in that region 
have aptly demonstrated that external stabilization in such contexts is only possible when 
protectorates are established and supported and defended for an undetermined period of 
time. Obviously, the OECD world is not ready and not able to guarantee this.  
Structural Problems 
Legitimacy problems may be easier to overcome in gated communities smaller than most 
nation states, for example in city regions. Democracy could be defined in such a way that 
participation is linked to certain qualifications and contributions of groups of citizens. For 
communities bigger than states, legitimacy problems will be bigger, too and may, in fact, 
seem insurmountable. 
 
 
 
Scenario 3: Global Learning 
 
Independent Variables  
 Many, but limited levels of political action,  
increasingly connected by institutions, norms, rules and values. 
 Many, but similarly minded players of different origin and 
potentials, following basic rules of the game. 
 Organic mixture between different types of resources. 
Values of Outcomes  
 Increasing relative stability (medium to long term) 
 Increasing cooperation (multi-level) 
 
Capital flows 
There are many actors of different types involved – state and non-state, commercial and so-
cietal, formal and informal. The resources they have available differ. But even in extreme 
cases, governments do not seem to be able to effectively control money flows. The same is 
true for international organizations. While the tools at the disposal of organizations like the 
IMF and the World Bank are impressive – their influence rests on the nature of credits given 
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as itinerate games – they cannot by themselves guarantee a consistent and sustainable de-
velopment of capital flows. Private rating agencies are decisive in narrowing or widening the 
access of national economies and TNCs to credits on favorable – or not so favorable – 
terms. Semi- or illegal lenders may resort to force in cases of extended credit terms. Pension 
and investment funds are among the biggest actors and command impressive weight by fuel-
ing and influencing capital flows.  
Yet all, or most of these actors may still conclude that under certain conditions it is in their 
own interest to set a framework of viable rules. These may be preferable to the risks involved 
in anarchy and gated city or country regions. This scenario implies successful games be-
tween different types of actors to produce a degree of trust required for effectively building 
norms and institutions. 
Energy 
Europe is not able to produce the amount and quality of energy required for maintaining and 
increasing its demands for producers and consumers. At the same time, the energy extract-
ing and exporting regions and countries need stable demand.  
This mutual dependency may be used for establishing relatively reliable mechanisms for the 
exchange of energy, with prices floating in an established corridor. If set in a proper way 
such a price corridor could be useful in two ways: if prices are high enough they set incen-
tives in the importing countries for substituting not renewable energy with new sources. At 
the same time, prices should be low enough to reduce the structural dependencies of the 
exporting countries on this sole category of goods and to encourage the development of ad-
ditional segments of the economy. 
The increasingly visible effects of a climate change, even in Central Europe, should help to 
understand that without decisive measures toward energy producing and consumption pat-
terns based on renewable sources, the whole planet and every country, no matter how rich it 
may be, are not defendable. 
Content flows 
How important images are should have become clear at last after Ayatollah Khomeini’s me-
dia-prepared return to Iran in 1979. The role of the electronic mass media for social and po-
litical changes was demonstrated over and over again, including the background, the possi-
ble motivation, and the coverage of the events on 9/11 in 2001. The role of CNN and Al 
Jazeera, the effects of Mexican TV serials in Russia during the 1990s and the coverage of 
papal visits all over the world are telling examples of the impact of media-transmitted images. 
Regulation of these flows is existent. Yet it is not efficient, especially not across national 
boundaries and on the WWW. When anarchy is not tolerable and when isolated solutions for 
gated communities do not work, it may be acceptable – as a second-best solution - that there 
is no other way than to live with these images. The strategy, then, would not be to block and 
regulate content flows. Rather, children and juveniles would be enabled to live with them in 
an active way. This strategy seems to be more promising than futile attempts to control what 
finds its way through different channels anyway. 
The Role of the US 
The political weight of the US is the strongest in the global world of the early 21st century. 
When economic and military capacities are mobilized and directed toward a goal supported 
by a broad consensus in the US, there are hardly any forces in this world to effectively resist 
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these attempts. At least for the time being. At the same time, commercial and civic non-state 
actors in the United States are well developed and highly influential. US based TNCs are 
among the most innovative and profitable worldwide. There are huge numbers of NGOs in 
the US acting domestically and transnationally and giving society a robust texture.  
The significant resource differentials between the US and all other actors and groups of ac-
tors usually do not lead to unilaterally defined outcomes. When projecting its unprecedented 
military power, the US can deny unwelcome outcomes, but they often cannot convert these 
denial capabilities into positive shaping capacities. Among many examples, the most telling 
recent cases are the limitations of the US impact in implementing a solution in the Middle 
East and the problems of nation-building after driving the Taleban out of power in Afghani-
stan, and Saddam out of office in Iraq. Older examples include the inability to enforce a re-
gime change in Cuba, the disaster in Vietnam or the unsuccessful attempts to pacify the In-
dian-Pakistan conflict. 
The point here is not to unfairly criticize the US for not solving complex problems. The mes-
sage is that neither hardcore US hawks nor friends of conspiracy theories and master plans 
all over the world can calmly expect and predict certain outcomes because they are suppos-
edly in the US national interest. 
The apparent mismatch between the power concentrated in the US and the limited political 
impact in terms of addressing and resolving problems has to do with the fact that politics are 
formed and built at different levels of activity. Certainly, when analyzing the state level, the 
US are the most powerful state – before the collapse of the USSR, and even more so after-
ward. The technological finesse and the military capabilities are “second to none”. Yet when 
it comes to regional trade blocs like NAFTA and the EU, to local affairs like regional conflicts, 
hostage taking and economic turmoil, and to capital and content flows, the US are influential 
and important, but by far not the only relevant player in town.  
This may lead, over time, to a reassessment of how to best pursue American interests. There 
are certainly arenas where unilateralism will seem to be the best option – especially when 
regimes and institutions are either weak, not enforced, or subject to permanent change by 
majorities of actors not necessarily friendly with US positions. But there are also policy fields 
which are candidates for regulation by rules. So the United States may act as a benign he-
gemon in some areas and a rule-observing actor in others. This requires a realistic re-
assessment of US prospects in the other scenarios – an anarchic environment with basic 
policy fields unregulated and increasingly out of control, or a political gated communities 
concept that runs counter to globalization and hardly would enclose all of the heartland US. 
When, and only when these two options seem unfavorable to most of the domestic US ac-
tors, reassessment and learning will take place. Only then, the third option of rules can be 
implemented. 
The Role of the Russian Federation 
The preference structure among basic actors in the Russian Federation also matters. That 
could be seen in the 1990s, when their interests where particularly short-term and volatile. 
This made Russia a source of instability in Europe and beyond. Yet since about 1999/2000, 
a new equilibrium among most of the relevant groups of economic and political actors has 
emerged. Regional and sectoral, federal and local actors have redefined their interests. The 
resulting new interest structure has produced a different political configuration and has 
opened new opportunities for strengthening some of the formerly lost state functions.  
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Still, there is and remains some experience in handling multilevel situations. This was the 
dominant feature of domestic Russian politics in the 1990s. Also, there has been – and still is 
– a multitude of actors who act in an underregulated context. This has produced experiences 
which were later overcome – and which explain the Russian behavior in inter- and transna-
tional contexts since about 2000. As rule-making and observation have grown dominant in 
the domestic realm, they have also become an organizing principle in international relations. 
The RF, therefore, should be interested in and able to cooperate in an institutionalized con-
text.  
The Role of the European Union 
The EU is by definition and in practice an example of institutions (rules). Nation states have 
agreed to voluntarily transfer sovereignty to regimes in an increasing number of policy fields. 
In the spheres where institutions are working there are certainly also problems, but they are 
usually overcome in the framework of those institutions and through negotiations.  
The EU as a mechanism is so attractive that more and more countries want to join it. Re-
cently, a new round of negotiations with ten European nations has been concluded. While 
economic, financial, agricultural, justice and migration policies are more and rather effectively 
integrated, the foreign and security policy is in disarray, as the Iraq crisis has demonstrated. 
If a new framework can be worked out is unclear, to say the least.  
This is not to imply that the functioning regimes are spotless. The common agricultural policy 
is effectively a waste of money. Certain other subsidies decrease competitiveness. Innova-
tion, creativity and deregulation are not famous features of the EU. But the successes are 
more important. There is no prospect of serious conflicts between member states. The Euro 
is working well – despite some problems after its introduction. The 3% limit on aggregated 
state debt is meant to serve as a powerful tool against fiscal spending mentalities and pro-
duces overall stability (yet there has been some discussion recently about relaxing this provi-
sion). In sum, the EU is certainly a powerful voice in favor of regime building.  
The Role of China 
China’s future development is a difficult variable in this scenario. Emerging powers and mar-
kets may not easily be ready to accept rules and regimes. At least this will take some time. 
Currently, the still leading generation of decision makers in China is mostly thinking in terms 
of geopolitics. Only a new generation with new ways of thinking would be able to join political 
and economic networks and to formally transfer sovereignty. 
Regional Conflicts 
It is unrealistic to expect that regional conflicts will disappear. But it should be possible to 
anticipate regional conflicts, to offer stable counter-incentives against separation and nation 
building, and regulate more effectively once they erupt. The most important component is an 
incentive structure for regional and political elites which makes it not profitable to engage in 
regional separatism and nation building. Another component is the solid expectation that 
international rules should not legitimize, and the relevant international actors should not ac-
cept, such behavior.  
Structural Problems 
Legitimacy of decision making bodies in a multilevel, multipolar world is hard to achieve. 
Nevertheless, political processes can be organized by rules. The EU is an example of a 
complex, institutionalized body which is not sufficiently legitimized. Patchwork-like configura-
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tions are even harder to legitimize. But this may create a situation where the payoffs between 
traditional, formal legitimacy on the one hand, and participation of citizens on different levels 
depending on their contributions and qualifications on the other hand can be openly dis-
cussed. 
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4.  Evaluation 
 
 
The Coming Anarchy  
The prospect of a coming anarchy still seems slightly far fetched - but it can be imagined. As 
of 2003, there are clear deficits in governance – analytically and practically. Even supposing 
more external shocks on the scale of 9/11, followed by more radical shifts of perception to-
ward urgent tasks among elites and the public at large, effective learning may be a process 
too slow for coping with old and new challenges. The old mental maps and behavioral pat-
terns are simple, easy to understand, media-like, compatible with existing mind sets and 
popular. They can be reinforced rather easily by functional elites and image production by 
the mass media. 
After the end of the East-West Conflict, traditional institutions and organizations in the former 
Eastern Bloc have disappeared. Other organizations and norms are in trouble as well. The 
effectiveness and fate of the OSCE are debatable. NATO has simultaneously struggled to 
digest one round of enlargement when it had to prepare for the second round, to manage 
institutional reforms and to show that it plays a meaningful role in situations like 9/11.  
The economic institutions and organizations – the WTO, World Bank, IMF – are also in a 
process of redefinition. It seems very difficult to find an adequate mission which can be im-
plemented and serves the interests of over 200 nation states and thousands of TNCs and 
NGOs.  
New exploding regional conflicts, waves of migrants, domestic populist movements, more 
separatist sentiments in core European states and other, similar developments could lead to 
a scenario which would be characterized by weak and eroding institutions and rules, by a 
weakening of EU regimes, by increasing competition between countries and social groups, 
by enduring social conflicts, ethnic tensions, weakening economies and derailing social co-
hesions. Still, the likelihood of this scenario seems limited in 2003. Increasing fragmentation 
of states and state-based institutions and organizations, however, seems unavoidable.  
 
Gated communities 
While the first scenario is an option but may not be too likely and certainly not welcome, 
other options have to be tested and discussed. One possible option is the transfer of the 
concept of gated communities from domestic contexts to global politics. Europe, or most of it, 
would be guarded and defended at its external perimeters, or at least around certain core 
regions. Problems beyond this border would have to be left to themselves.  
This could imply first and foremost a stabilization of the OECD world itself, primarily in terms 
of conflict prevention, financial and trade institutions, common currencies and the regulation 
of content flows. The next priority has to be the immediate neighborhood where instabilities 
might occur and lead to consequences in the core region itself: first of all Turkey and Egypt. 
The US should look after Mexico. It seems likely that Russia would join such an initiative for 
stability, especially if it proved able to take care of her own borders, and if the European 
neighbors accepted that – including fortification of her southern borders . This scenario high-
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lights two further candidates for closer inspection and protective action – Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan.  
We have to accept that it does not seem viable to stabilize the world with the resources gen-
erated by OECD countries (even including Russia and China), and that it is certainly not real-
istic to create a protectorate in every hot spot of the world. Such an approach is simply not 
tenable, and it would also encourage local elite groups to provoke such an outcome. This 
selective approach also suffers from its pragmatism and ethic flaws. 
As a second-best option after global learning, it may nevertheless be considered for further 
reflection. Even if this scenario does not appear realistic or even necessary in 2003, it should 
not be excluded. Under certain conditions, European actors might reassess their options and 
decide that their particular interests are better served by decisively enhancing the power of 
the EU and by limiting the political and security focus of the EU to Europe itself. 
 
Global Learning 
This kind of setting can probably only be brought about by one out of two constellations: the 
appearance of a benign hegemon, or acute catastrophes.  
A benign hegemon is not (yet?) in sight. If there was one, he would have to be accompanied 
by actors realistically calculating their past experiences and their future options. Only a fun-
damental redefinition of US interests and a large shift in its domestic landscape could bring 
the world closer to such an outcome. And even then it would not necessarily be a likely out-
come.  
Catastrophes of a magnitude enabling a fundamental rethinking of mankind can happen. A 
quick review of the consequences of Chernobyl, the genocide in Rwanda, floods and hurri-
canes, 9/11 and the like, however, do not give much grounds for optimism.  
If the rather formal UN and European parlance of strategies for supporting sustainable de-
velopment was to become meaningful, it would have to be assisted by new and effective 
mechanisms of global governance. This outcome does not seem likely. Furthermore, failing 
states and societies would have to be stabilized and failed communities rebuilt. Kofi Annan 
and Joseph Fischer are, among others, active proponents of this economic and social antici-
patory work.  
Yet there is a long way to go toward effective, not just rhetorical good governance. More and 
stricter standards have to be established for labor and health conditions, the observation of 
human and minority rights, for the protection of the environment, of natural resources and of 
children, the enabling of women and young people, against corruption. Such norms unavoid-
ably produce “losers” among those living today. The preferences would have to shift toward 
the well-being of future generations to make learning real and sustainable. 
For researchers a new form and style of mapping are required – a new cartography of places 
and spaces; a new typology of actors; much more reflection on the consequences of com-
pression of time, on acceleration; on social and cultural reactions toward new opportunities 
and challenges – from accommodation to resistance, from indigenization to ignorance. 
In sum, fresh thinking may have a chance. At this moment it does not seem realistic to ex-
pect the transformation of old-fashioned mindsets – learning – at a pace sufficient for a glob-
alizing world with (too?) many dislocations, disjunctures and risks.  
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At the time of writing, there are at least two major trends. First, the US insistence on going it 
alone, addressing self-defined rogue states and axes of evil, applying preemptive measures 
against often weakly proven risks, fighting distant wars with selected allied governments, and 
leaving subsequent attempts of nation-building to the Europeans. But there is no grand de-
sign whatsoever of how to solve basic problems beyond that. While this seems to fit nicely in 
realist assumptions, it rather shows the importance of domestic factors in global politics.  
Second, fundamentalism is a worldwide phenomenon. There are lots of fundamentalisms, 
but they basically seem to agree that the predominant feature, the model of Western, capital-
ist and secular development, is evil. For them pluralism is chaos; freedom to select, or com-
bine, lifestyles equals degeneration. Social groups and countries following this seductive 
path are doomed to fail, or to vanish. Moreover, they are guilty, because they have allegedly 
caused the defeats and misfortunes in the less developed or isolated regions. Therefore, 
they may – or must – be attacked in self-defense. With active proponents and representa-
tives of radical fundamentalism, there seems to be almost no ground and room for negotia-
tion. This may imply that fundamentalism has to de defeated - intellectually, socially, and 
militarily.  
In such an environment, and in terms of pragmatic thinking, selective stabilization may be a 
serious candidate for a new concept. It is narrower and, therefore, more compatible with op-
erational concepts like moderation or navigation – instead of all-encompassing regulation - or 
with learning, which is so much desired but possibly out of reach. 
